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THE ANTITRUST SUITS AND THE PUBLIC
UNDERSTANDING OF INSURANCE
GEORGE L. PRIEST*
The social significance of the insurance antitrust suits
extends beyond the specific legal issues of McCarran-Ferguson
Act interpretation and the economics of boycotts. Few people
have forgotten the extraordinary insurance disruptions of 1985-
1986. For liability insurance reasons, jails, day care centers, and
ski lifts were closed; police patrols were suspended; and play-
ground equipment and diving boards were removed from public
schools and parks. For similar reasons, nurse-midwives could
not obtain insurance and doctors fled from obstetric specialties. 1
Though perhaps more quietly, producers removed scores of
products from markets and product innovation declined.2
The insurance antitrust suits represent a national trial of the
source of ~hese disruptions. Narrowly, the suits claim that one
principal phenomenon of the crisis, the withdrawal of occur-
rence, pollution, and defense cost insurance coverage, was gener-
ated by collusive practices of insurers, rather than by the
expansion of tort liability. But the suits' broader social import
stems from their implied allegation that the insurance industry
possesses a combination of unbridled power and a voracious
desire for profits that give it the ability and impetus to engage in
massive manipulation of product and service markets, even of
such central, yet vulnerable, services as municipal parks, day
care, and obstetrics. In this respect, the suits represent the dele-
gation to a jury, not merely of legal issues involving standard
insurance forms, but of the broader charges of power, manipula-
tion, and excessive profit making and of issues regarding the role
* John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School. I am grateful to
the Program in Civil Liability, Yale Law School, for support.
1. For a further description of these phenomena, see Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521-22, 1585 (1987), and sources cited
therein [hereinafter Priest, Insurance Crisis].
2. A Conference Board Survey showed that in 1986, among all United States
manufacturers, 47% withdrew products from markets, 39% decided against introducing
new products, and 25% discontinued new product research, all because ofgreater expected
liability exposure. See McGuire, The Impact ofProduct Liability, CONF. BD., Rep. No.
908, at 20, Table 30 (1988).
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and impact of state insurance regulation. The resolution of the
suits may signal the direction of statutory and regulatory poli-
cies toward the insurance industry for the decade to come.
The insurance antitrust suits are currently only one ofmany
manifestations of deep social suspicion of the insurance industry.
Support continues to grow for repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's3 limited exemption of insurance practices from the federal
antitrust laws.4 The recent enactment by referendum of Propo-
sition 103 in California,5 which mandated a twenty percent roll-
back in insurance premiums, is the most extreme example of
popular distrust of insurer pricing and profits. Indeed, such dis-
trust has expanded to become counterproductive. The Califor-
nia premium roll-pack, if constitutionally upheld, cannot help
the consumer population and will surely reduce insurance avail-
ability. But the popular distrust of the insurance industry is so
severe that it seems certain to intensify if the courts strike down
the roll-back, yet it is likely to increase even more if courts
uphold the roll-back and insurers leave the state.
Few people would contest the importance of insurance in
modem life. Indeed, few would dispute that a central ambition
of a civilized society is to maximize the availability of insurance
against all forms of prospective 10ss.6 The broader significance
of insurance in modem society thus suggests the importance of
formulating policies toward the insurance industry with a clear
view of how insurance operates and how to enhance insurance
availability. In the context of the antitrust suits, it is especially
important to evaluate the Attorneys' General claims, along with
other theories of insurer antitrust violations, in the broader con-
text of the overall structure of the commercial casualty industry
and the longer-term changes in industry structure and practice
since the early 1970s.
Regrettably, both the claims of the Attorneys General and
3. McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982).
4. See American Bar Ass'n, Report of the Commission to Improve the Liability
Insurance System 64-65 (Feb. 6-7, 1989) (1989 Midyear Meeting) (recommending repeal
subject to defenses for collectively efficient industry practices) [hereinafter Insurance
Comm'n Report]. I was a member of this Commission and concurred in recommending
McCarran-Ferguson Act repeal.
5. CALIF. INS. CODE § 1861.01(a) (West Gen'l Election Supp. 1989).
6. I believe this conclusion is the heart of the most influential philosophical
justification for the modem state. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
For an elaboration of this view, see G. Priest, The Role of the State in Risk-Spreading
(1987) (copy on file with author).
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other anticompetitive theories of the insurance coverage with-
drawals, such as that of Professor Ayres and Mr. Siegelman,7
ignore the broader context of the industry structure and its
evolution. Though there are differences between them,8 both the
claims of the Attorneys General and those of Ayres and Siegel-
man neglect crucially relevant characteristics of the commercial
casualty insurance industry. The Attorneys' General complaints
(as well as their broader statements explaining the suits)9 are
built upon a very limited set of facts concerning the circum-
stances of the coverage withdrawals. Ayres and Siegelman,
more oddly yet, constrain their analysis to nothing beyond the
facts alleged in the Attorneys' General complaints. lO Both theo-
ries ignore easily available information concerning structural
conditions of the industry and other data concerning industry
developments in the preceding decades.
As we shall see, this limited vision substantially clouds both
conclusions that the coverage withdrawals restrained trade. The
broader context of developments in the commercial casualty
industry since the 1970s powerfully demonstrates how the
expansion of tort liability undermines insurance pools and leads
to the selective withdrawal of insurance coverage. This demon-
stration,11 along with evidence of industry structure, uncovers
the weakness of the Attorneys' General complaints. Moreover,
the particular cost structure of insurance services and the ease of
entry into the commercial liability insurance industry make the
Ayres-Siegelman exclusionary theory particularly unrealistic.
Part I of this Article describes the structure of the commer-
cial casualty insurance industry. It discusses ev.idence of general
competitiveness within the industry, and it documents the dra-
matic shift toward self-insurance that appears to have begun in
the early 1970s. Part II applies this understanding of industry
7. See Ayres & Siegelman, The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward
an Exclusionary Theory, 63 TuL. L. REV. 971 (1989).
8. The most significant difference is the Ayres-Siegelman criticism that the Attorneys
General have no coherent explanation of how coverage withdrawals could increase
insurance profits. Id. at 980-81. For a further discussion of this point, see infra notes 29-31
and accompanying text.
9. Office of the Attorney General State of California, Fact Sheet on the Multi-State
Prosecution ofAntitrust Violations in the Insurance Industry, Mar. 22, 1988.
10. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 973 ("This Article will ... analyze, under a
demurrer standard, whether a coherent economic theory underlies the plaintiffs' Sherman
Act claims.").
11. See generally Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note I, criticized in Ayres &
Siegelman, supra note 7, at 982-85.
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structure to an analysis of the specific antitrust claims of the
Attorneys General. Part II shows the link between the with-
drawal of pollution, defense cost, and occurrence coverage. and
the broader changes in industry structure since the 1970s. It
also explains why the withdrawal of these forms of coverage,
although limited in impact, more likely expanded, rather than
contracted, insurance availability. This discussion strongly
implies that the Attorneys' General complaints about insurer
practices, besides lacking antitrust merit, are particularly
adverse to the broad social desire to expand the availability of
insurance and to lower insurance prices. Next, Part III consid-
ers the Ayres-Siegelman exclusionary hypothesis of the coverage
withdrawals·. This Part shows why structural conditions of the
industry make any effort to raise rivals' costs impractical.
Finally, Part IV describes how future policies toward the indus-
try must be defined more broadly to facilitate the provision of
insurance and increase insurance availability, especially to low-
risk insureds (such as those persons with low income) to whom
insurance might otherwise be denied.
I. THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE COMMERCIAL
CASUALTY INDUSTRY, 1970-1986, AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO THE EXPANSION OF TORT
LIABILITY
Insurance offerings are divided between personal lines-life
insurance, health insurance, annuities, consumer automobile
insurance, and homeowners' liability insurance-and commer-
ciallines, the largest of which is commercial property/casualty
insurance. The distinction between personal and commercial
lines derives, most importantly, from the nature of the parties
purchasing insurance: personal lines are purchased by consum-
ers, whom regulators seek to protect because consumers are gen-
erally regarded as uninformed about insurance, and commercial
lines are purchased by b-Qsiness firms which, because of greater
commercial ability, compel less regulatory protection.
The insurance crisis of 1985-1986 affected only commercial
casualty insurance lines, in particular the "Other Liability" and
"Medical Malpractice" insurance lines, as they are classified in
industry reports. Other Liability includes products liability,
professional liability, and, more generally, commercial coverage
of personal injury claims against insured corporations. The
Attorneys' General antitrust suits are directed solely at practices
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in the Other Liability and Medical Malpractice lines.12 To
understand the antitrust suits as well as the 1985-1986 crisis, it is
important to appreciate the structural conditions of the commer-
cial casualty industry that offers these lines of coverage.
By all accounts, the commercial casualty industry has
always been highly competitive. Both for the industry as a
whole and for specific insurance lines, individual firm market
shares are low. 13 As a result, industry concentration levels are
low. For example, in 1986, the four-firm concentration ratio for
Other Liability was less than twenty-nine percent. 14 Market
shares and concentration ratios were low even within individual
states. Justice Department Merger Guidelines regard an indus-
try as unconcentrated if it possesses a Herfindahl index of less
than 1000 when the market shares of all potential industry
entrants are included in the index calculation. 15 Table 1 displays
1986 Herfindahl indices by state for the Other Liability line in
declining order of concentration. The figures in Table 1, how-
ever, were calculated from the market shares solely of existing
insurers, ignoring potential entrants and thus substantially over-
stating concentration as measured by the Justice Department.
Yet, even overstated, Table 1 shows that the Other Liability
index exceeds 1000 in only one state.
Table I also shows, by state, the number of insurers offering
Other Liability coverage. Obviously, the more populous states,
such as Pennsylvania (235 firms), Illinois (225 firms), New York
(219 firms), and California (204 firms) contain the largest
number of insurers. But even in the least populous states, Other
Liability coverage is offered by a large number of firms, such as
in Hawaii (by 101 firms), Alaska (by 121 firms), and Wyoming
(by 130 firms).
The low concentration ratios and large number of existing
carriers result from the very low costs of entry into the commer-
cial casualty industry. Insurance, in essence, is a financial ser-
vice. Aside from regulatory requirements, entry into the
12. Actually, the suits may be only directed at practices in the Other Liability line. I
have included reference to Medical Malpractice because of the use of claims-made policies
in this line, one of the subject matter concerns of the lawsuits. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text.
13. Insurance Comm'n Report, supra note 4, at 14.
14. Id.
15. United States Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1984), reprinted in
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, app. A-21 (1st Supp.
1983-88).
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TABLE 1
Market Structure of Other Liability Line
Number of Firms, Herfindahl Index, by State
State No. of Herfindahl State No. of Herfindahl
Firms Index Firms Index
MI 184 1,780 TN 203 390
RI 130 967 NC 179 388
VT 134 958 AR 173 383
WY 130 888 KS 177 379
DE 160 610 MD 198 371
CT 154 609 WA 176 362
NH 133 570 UT 163 362
NY 219 558 GA 209 361
HI 101 555 OR 175 359
ME 127 554 FL 225 359
NY 152 551 CA 204 358
DC 145 550 IL 225 352
WV 164 542 MN 186 352
LA 189 524 WI 193 351
MS 178 516 ID 161 343
AK 121 513 MO 199 334
MA 156 506 SC 184 333
MT 150 455 US 648 332
CO 181 454 NE 172 331
NJ 174 448 OH 217 326
AZ 183 440 NM 155 321
VA 196 412 AL 188 319
TX 219 411 ND 151 317
OK 186 403 IA 193 306
KY 195 396 SD 157 282
PA 235 396 IN 229 266
Source: Florida Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems,
Final Fact-Finding Report on Insurance and Tort Systems, at 140-41 (Mar. 1,
1988).
industry can be achieved without heavy fixed-capital invest-
ments, but with the simple accumulation of capital. 16 All state
insurance regulators impose minimum solvency requirements.
Yet no modern commentator has asserted that solvency require-
16. For the same reason, exit costs are l?w; this is an important, though often
neglected, feature of competitive markets.
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ments shield existing firms from competition in any substantial
way.17
The intrinsically financial character of insurance also :tneans
that, besides new entry, there are no serious limitations to expan-
sion by existing firms. The very substantial change from year to
year in the success of individual firms in specific commercial cas-
ualty sublines is evidence of this. Even within individual states,
firm rankings, in terms of commercial casualty premiums writ-
ten, change dramatically from year to year,18 which is character-
istic of high levels of competition.
Beyond the competition provided by existing carriers, com-
mercial casualty insurers face potential competition from
insured firms themselves. Not all commercial firms purchase
insurance. Indeed, the corporate purchase of commercialliabil-
ity insurance has proven something of a puzzle because corpora-
tions have many potential methods of diversifying to reduce the
effect of potential losses.19 As I shall discuss in more detail
below, the extent of corporate self-insurance has increased sub-
stantially over time through the creation of firm or industry cap-
tive insurance subsidiaries and industry-wide mutuals.20 Again,
in concept, the potential competition from corporate self-insur-
ance should be included in any concentration calculation. Thus,
viewed more generally as a form of financial diversification,
commercial casualty insurance faces competition from a very
wide set of financial instruments.
The Medical Malpractice subline of the commercial casu-
alty line is characterized by somewhat greater concentration
than the Other Liability subline. Nationally, in 1986, the largest
medical malpractice insurer possessed only an 18.2 percent mar-
ket share; the four-firm concentration ratio for the subline was
less than 35 percent.21 Within individual states, however, con-
centration was greater. Typically, high concentration resulted
from the large size of medical association and residual mutual
17. For a careful description of ease of entry and exit within a specific state, see
Florida Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems, Final Fact-
Finding Report on Insurance and Tort Systems, 135, 144-50 (Mar. 1, 1988) [hereinafter
Florida Task Force].
18. See America Ins. Ass'n, Competition in the Property and Casualty Insurance
Industry: An Analysis of Seven Major Insurance Lines, app. 13 (Apr. 1988).
19. Studies of the corporate purchase of insurance are surveyed in Priest, Insurance
Crisis, supra note 1, at 1560-62.
20. See infra Figures 1 & 2; notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
21. Insurance Comm'n Report, supra note 4, at 14.
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carriers that were created to offer coverage at lower premiums
than market insurers. Because these carriers are controlled
either by state regulators or by insured doctors themselves, their
high market shares do not -generally suggest potential monopoly
behavior. Moreover, as noted before, these market shares and
concentration ratios are calculated without regard to potential
entry into the industry-including entry by further shifts toward
self-insurance or to other forms of financial diversification-and
thus exaggerate concentration.
The large numbers of carriers in every state, extremely low
concentration, and great ease of entry all imply that anticom-
petitive practices are unlikely to be successful in the commercial
casualty industry. Indeed, on these grounds alone, commercial
casualty probably more closely resembles the atomistic ideal of
perfect competition than any other nationwide industry. The
particular character of commercial casualty underwriting rein-
forces the point. Much of the insurance coverage implicated in
the antitrust suits and in the recent crisis consists of what is
called special risk underwriting: the provision of insurance in a
highly individualized manner to insured firms, with premiums
set according to the particular characteristics of the insured firm
itself. Some industry experts have argued that, because special
risk underwriting involves such a high degree of individualized
rate-setting and coverage definition, all insurance commission
attempts to regulate the commercial casualty industry will be
ineffectual.22 These characteristics of special risk underwriting,
however, make attempts to coordinate insurer action equally
ineffectual. To be successful, cartelization requires a standard-
ized product sold to uninformed consumers,23 just the opposite
of commercial casualty insurance, in which individualized insur-
ance products are sold to expert commercial consumers.
The low concentration level of the commercial casualty
insurance industry apparently has remained constant for
decades. But since the early 1970s, an important change has
occurred in the character of the industry: a steadily increasing
shift away from market insurance toward corporate self-insur-
ance of expected liability exposure. The increased self-insurance
has taken three principal forms. First, many corporations have
formed their own captive insurance subsidiaries to write and
22. Richard Stewart, Remembering a Stable Future (Jan. 14, 1989) (address delivered
at the ISO-III Industry Conference, copy on file with author).
23. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 336-40 (1981).
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manage coverage of the firm's expected losses. Second, in
selected industries, firms have formed industry-wide mutuals.
These mutuals typically provide for subsequent assessments
against firm members based upon the liability experience of the
mutual for the year. The mutual form thus provides insurance
against risks specific to individual firms while binding together
all member firms to self-insure risks common to the industry.
The third and more basic form of corporate self-insurance has
been the greater retention of exposure by means of higher
deductibles, greater coinsurance proportions, and more exten-
sive coverage exclusions.
Figure 1 illustrates the growth in numbers of captive insur-
ance subsidiaries since 1970.24 Though not all captives write
equivalent amounts of coverage (specific totals are unavailable),
Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic increase since 1970 in employ-
ment of the captive form.
Figure 2 presents estimates that show the increase in self-
insurance as a percentage of total casualty premiums and costs
for the Other Liability line, most central to the antitrust suits
and the recent crisis. The Premiums curve represents actual pre-
miums paid to captive and mutual insurers as a percentage of
total Other Liability premiums. Figure 2 shows that from 1970
to 1986 self-insurance premiums rose from 1.5 to 31.9 percent of
total Other Liability premiums. Although the Premiums curve
represents both premiums paid to mutuals and those paid to cap-
tives, mutual premiums in 1986, according to Best's, constituted
only 11.1 percent of total Other Liability premiums.2s Though
these estimates may not totally correspond, they suggest that
captive premiums constitute around twenty percent of total
Other Liability premiums.
The Total Costs curve in Figure 2 is derived from estimates
of firms' total liability costs, including premiums paid to captives
or mutuals as well as all other retentions of exposure through
deductibles, coinsurance, and the like.26 The curve shows self-
insurance expen~itures as a proportion of total liability expendi-
24. The only available data report existing captives from 1970 to 1979, Conning &
Co., The Changing Commercial Lines Markets, INS. MGMT. SERVS., Dec. 1980, at 55
[hereinafter Conning & Co., 1980], and new captive fonnations from 1980 to 1986,
Conning & Co., Alternative Commercial Lines Insurance Mechanisms, INS. MGMT. SERVS.,
Apr. 1987, at 6 [hereafter Conning & Co., 1987], thus overstating surviving captives by
some amount in the years 1980.1986.
25. BEST'S, AGGREGATES & AVERAGES, PROPERTY-CASUALTY (48th ed. 1987).
26. The estimate was compiled through a survey of risk managers reporting liability















_ Number of Captives
Source: Conning & Co., 1980, supra note 24, at 55; Conning & Co., 1987, supra
note 24, at 6.
tures for Other Liability exposures. The Total Costs curve
reveals that the corporate shift toward self-insurance since 1970
has been more dramatic than is suggested by the rise in premi-
ums alone. Total self-insurance costs have increased from 4.9
percent in 1970 to 51.7 percent of aggregate Other Liability
expenditures in 1979. Thus, over half of Other Liability expend-
itures in 1979 were self-insurance expenditures. Although there
expenditures in all fonns for the preceding year. Conning & Co., 1980, supra note 24, at
46, 71; Conning & Co., 1987, supra note 24, at 13, 20.
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FIGURE 2
SELF-INSURANCE & CAPTIVES, OTHER LIABILITY







Source: Conning & Co., 1980, supra note 24, at 46, 71; Conning & Co., 1987,
supra note 24, at 13, 20.
are no available estimates of total self-insurance costs more
recent than 1979, the Premiums curve in Figure 2 shows that,
from 1979 to 1986, the proportion of self-insurance premiums
almost doubled (from 16.7 to 31.9 percent). Even if there were
no additional increases in self-insurance costs (though it is clear
there were, especially during the crisis of 1985-1986),27 total se1f-
insurance costs must have been at least in the range of 60 to 80
percent of aggregate Other Liability expenditures in 1986.
Expenditures for more basic forms of se1f-insurance-
deductib1es, coinsurance, coverage exclusions-appear as the
difference between the Total Costs and Premiums curves. As is
27. For examples of increases in deductibles, coinsurance, and exclusion, see
generally Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1.
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evident, expenditures on these forms of self-insurance were ris-
ing rapidly through 1979, especially in the years after 1974.
There are no equally detailed data available for the Medical
Malpractice line, but the shift to self-insurance has been similar,
and probably more extensive. Conning & Co. estimates that in
1983 and 1986 self-insurance premiums for Medical Malpractice
constituted 30.4 and 40 percent of total casualty premiums,
respectively, an amount greater than the 29.6 and 31.9 percent
of Other Liability self-insurance premiums for both years.28
What accounts for the tremendous increase in self-insur-
ance in the Other Liability and Medical Malpractice lines?
There are no general accounts of the determinants of the shift
from market insurance to self-insurance. Professor Ayres and
Mr. Siegelman hint that the shift may be the consequence of the
coverage withdrawals themselves: when insurers refuse to offer
coverage, firms must self-insure.29 But Ayres and Siegelman
derived their interpretation innocent of the information
presented above, showing that the shift to self-insurance has
been continuous and progressive since the early 1970s. No one
has claitned that insurers began colluding to withdraw coverage
in the 1970s. Though there were insurance premium crises in
the products liability and medical malpractice fields in the late
1970s, no coverage withdrawals occurring during that period
compare to those suffered during 1985-1986. There were cer-
tainly no year-to-year coverage withdrawals that might corre-
spond to the steady increase in captive formation or in self-
insurance premiums and costs illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
Most importantly, the Ayres-Siegelman interpretation is incon-
sistent with their own presumption that insurers, whether oper-
ating under conditions of competition or monopoly, will attempt
to maximize profits.3o As Ayres and Siegelman realize, encour-
aging a shift toward corporate self-insurance would reduce,
rather than increase, insurance industry profits.31
To understand the shift toward corporate self-insurance, it
is necessary to define the conditions under which a market
insurer will possess a comparative advantage in terms of loss
28. Conning & Co., 1987, supra note 24, at 20.
29. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 985 n.62.
30. [d. at 980-81.
31. This is the basis on which Ayres and Siegelman criticize the Attorneys General
for failing to define a coherent theory of the antitrust case. [d. at 980. For a further
discussion of this point, see infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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diversification. All corporations possess assets whose value is to
some degree firm-specific. Disposing of these assets to satisfy
liability judgments imposes real costs on a firm, costs that can be
reduced by investments of greater diversification. Market insur-
ers in the first instance are diversification agents; they translate
premiums to diversified equity markets. Market insurers also
provide a pooling service, reducing the costs of risk-bearing by
taking advantage of the statistical independence of loss. Risk
reduction through pooling, of course, can only occur when
losses are probabilistic and uncorrelated.32
A risk is uninsurable when market insurers have no com-
parative advantage to commercial insureds in terms of either
pooling or premium investment. There are two separate condi-
tions under which risks will be uninsurable in commercial mar-
kets. First, under conditions of extreme adverse selection, when
pooled risks are extremely disparate, insurance pools can
unravel and doom market insurance.33 Put differently, when
there are substantial differences in risks brought to a pool and
insurers have difficulty segregating low-risk from high-risk
insureds, low-risk insureds may drop out of the pool because of
the difference between the necessary pool premium and the risk
the insured brings to the pool. When risks are extremely dispa-
rate, the pool may unravel completely.34 Second, when the risks
faced by insureds are not independent, but are highly correlated,
the reserves required by a market insurer may equal or exceed
the reserves required by a self-insuring firm. 35 In such cases,
there is no comparative advantage to market insurance over self-
insurance.
The steady increase since the early 1970s in captive insurer
formation (Figure 1) and the similarly steady increase in the dif-
ference between self-insurance costs and captive premiums (Fig-
ure 2) are strong evidence of both conditions of uninsurability.
A firm forms a captive insurer when it believes that the premi-
ums necessary to support the captive are less than those charged
32. Marshall, Insurance Theory: Reserves Versus Mutuality, 12 BeON. INQUIRY 476,
477 (1974).
33. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons'~' Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488, 492-94 (1970).
34. For examples of this phenomenon, see Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at
1553-63.
35. Id. at 1578. A limiting example is when the firm faces prospective bankruptcy
because its liabilities, unlike the insurer's, might be greater than available assets. In such
cases market insurance would be more costly than self-insurance.
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by market insurers. The captive insurance form thus is advanta-
geous to an insured who knows or believes that the risk level
that it is generating is less than the risk level estimated by the
market insurer. This is adverse selection, the consequence of the
increasing variance of risks within risk pools. The growth of the
captive insurance form represents the effects of increasing
adverse selection in commercial casualty markets.36
The shift toward greater levels of basic self-insurance-
deductibles, coinsurance, coverage exclusions-may illustrate
either increasing variance of risk or increasing dependence of
risk, or both. An increase in a deductible or a coinsurance term
has two effects. First, it is a method of charging a greater pro-
portion of total liability costs to relatively high-risk-rather than
to low-risk-pool members. A large deductible or a high coin-
surance term is more costly to a firm that generates claims with
relatively great frequency or magnitude. A low-risk pool mem-
ber, thus, is better off if insurance coverage is offered with high
deductibles, coinsurance, and exclusions than if the premium
were raised to offset the costs of full insurance for the pool. It
follows that the shift toward greater self-insurance of this nature
is a method of reducing adverse selection in order to make mar-
ket insurance more attractive to low-risk members in the face of
increasing risk variance.
Deductibles, coinsurance terms, and exclusions may also be
increased, however, as a consequence of increasing dependence
of risks. For example, when all members of a risk pool are cer-
tain to suffer losses of some amount, there is little advantage in
insuring for that amount. True insurance would be impossible
because the losses would not be probabilistic. Similarly, if the
occurrence of some category of loss were highly correlated
among firms, an insurer would have no comparative advantage
over the firms themselves in providing coverage of the 10ss.37
The growth of the mutual insurance form also provides evi-
dence of diminution in the independence of corporate liability
exposure. As described above, mutuals set premiums by making
assessments to member firms after, rather than before, the loss
36. Ayres and Siegelman criticize my adverse selection explanation of the recent
insurance crisis as based on "highly restrictive assumptions." Ayres & Siegelman, supra
note 7, at 987. Far from assumption, Figure 1 provides very substantial evidence of the
phenomenon.
37. Captives may also represent pure self-insurance of this form if there is no true
pooling of firm-specific risks over time.
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experience, thus insuring for variations in loss among the firms,
but providing self-insurance for losses common to mutual mem-
bers.38 Why would a market insurer not provide such coverage?
If there is substantial correlation in some loss category among
mutual members, a market insurer will have no comparative
advantage in pooling risks related to this category of loss. The
market insurer might deal with this problem by offering cover-
age for some group losses, excluding coverage of the highly cor-
related loss. But exclusions-if enforced by the courts-are only
effective for narrow loss categories. If the particular loss cate-
gory is not sufficiently narrow, the mutual form may be prefera-
ble. The mutual allows the firms to achieve pooling for
individual firm risks-however minor-while unavoidably link-
ing the firms for risks common to the group.
The growth of captives and mutuals and the expansion of
the various forms of more basic self-insurance provide evidence
of increasing variance of risk and increasing dependence of risk
within the commercial casualty industry. Why would corporate
risks become more disparate and less independent since the early
1970s? There is an obvious explanation. In the mid-1960s,
courts began to expand tort liability for corporate activities, both
by extending affirmative duties and restricting available
defenses.39 The expansion of corporate tort liability will have
two effects. First, expanded corporate liability shifts insurance
burdens from first-party to third-party insurance sources. The·
shift to third-party liability insurance increases the variance of
risk and encourages adverse selection.40 Second, the expansion
of corporate liability reduces the independence of corporate
risks. Though some legal decisions implicate only individual
firm practices, many decisions, especially doctrinal innovations,
simultaneously affect large numbers of corporations and corpo-
rations within specific industries in particular.41 Decisions of
this nature reduce the independence of corporate risks, reduce
the comparative advantage of market insurers, and encourage
the shift from market to self-insurance.
The link between the shift toward greater self-insurance and
38. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1579-81.
39. See Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 505-19 (1986).
Specific doctrinal changes are detailed in Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1534-37.
40. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1534-37.
41. Obvious examples are decisions relaxing causation or design defect standards.
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the expansion of corporate tort liability is clear. The broadest
expansion of tort liability has occurred exactly in fields classified
as Other Liability coverage--products liability, professionallia-
bility, general liability for personal injuries from corporate oper-
ations-as well as in Medical Malpractice.42 The increases in
damage payouts through judgments and settlements in these
fields are well documented.43 Similar increases in tort claims
and payouts have been reported by self-insured firms or enti-
ties,44 providing strong evidence that increases in insurance costs
are not related solely to market insurer practices. Though some
have emphasized that the increase in commercial casualty pre-
miums has been greater than the apparent increase in liability
costs,4S the criticism ignores the effects of adverse selection.
When low-risk members drop out of insurance pools, insurance
premiums must rise even if there is no change in underlying lia-
bility costs. As a consequence, the expansion of tort liability is
the most plausible explanation for the commercial casualty
insurance industry's dramatic structural shift toward greater
self-insurance.
As mentioned earlier, the Attorneys' General antitrust
claims against the insurers largely neglect reference to changes
in industry structure over the past two decades: Part II of this
Article attempts to repair that deficiency by evaluating the anti-
trust claims against the evidence of the massive shift in commer-
cial casualty lines toward self-insurance.
II. THE ArrORNEYS' GENERAL ANTITRUST CLAIMS
IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMERCIAL CASUALTY
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
This Part examines in detail the Attorneys' General allega-
tions that the specific coverage withdrawals by major insurers
and reinsurers violate the antitrust laws. Section A reviews the
legal basis for the claims. It concludes that the various coverage
42. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1538.
43. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REpORT OF THE TORT POLICY
WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986).
44. Governor's Advisory Comm'n on Liability Insurance (New York), Insuring Our
Future, 35-39 (Apr. 7, 1986) [hereinafter Insuring Our Future].
45. Florida Task Force, supra note 17, at 14-15. I have also commented on this
point, criticizing what I regarded as simplistic conclusions by the Justice Department.
Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1523. But see infra text accompanying notes 105-
06.
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withdrawals cannot have caused antitrust injury.46 As a conse-
quence, even if the withdrawals were achieved in concert as
alleged, they cannot constitute an antitrust violation. Section B
. considers the coverage withdrawals in the context both of the
more general shift toward self-insurance in the commercial casu-
alty industry and of the more specific phenomenon of the liabil-
ity insurance crisis of 1985-1987. It shows that the coverage
withdrawals represent only an extension of the trend toward
greater self-insurance in commercial casualty lines and that the
withdrawals are closely similar to other responses of insurers
and self-insured firms during 1985-1987 to the prospect of
expanded liability. .
A. The Coverage Withdrawals, the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
and the Purpose of the Antitrust Laws
The Attorneys General claim that groups of insurers and
reinsurers illegally colluded to achieve three changes in the stan-
dard Commercial General Liability policy: The exclusion of
pollution coverage, the adoption of a claims-made rather than an
occurrence basis for the policy, and the inclusion of defense costs
in the policis aggregate limitS.47 To simplify discussion, these
coverage changes will be referred to as the withdrawal of pollu-
tion, occurrence, and defense cost coverage, although the term
withdrawal is an overstatement. Even as alleged, defense cost
coverage was not withdrawn, but merely subsumed within total
policy limits. Moreover, it is not clear how extensively these
coverage changes were introduced or whether the forms of cov-
erage withdrawn by the defendants were available from other
insurers on other policy forms. In my view, this factual issue is
ultimately unimportant to the resolution of the antitrust case.
Thus, for discussion, we may presume widespread introduction
46. Some of the discussion in this Part derives from Senate testimony I presented on
the antitrust suits. See The Liability Crisis, the Antitrust Suits and the McCa"an-Ferguson
Act, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, l00th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 14, 1988)
(testimony of G.L. Priest). I presented this testimony at the request of the American
Insurance Association, but on the condition that I would present my views alone, many of
which (I learned) are not shared by the Association. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
47. Complaint, New York v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 88 Civ. 0983 WWS (N.D. Cal.
filed March 22, 1988) [hereinafter Complaint]. For a detailed description of the complaint,
see Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 973-79.
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of the coverage changes.48
The Attorneys General allege that four major insurers
agreed upon these coverage changes and then implemented
them, first, by pressuring the Insurance Services Office to pro-
mulgate a new Commerchil General Liability policy incorporat-
ing the changes and, second, by inducing co-conspiring
reinsurers to insist upon such changes as a precondition for rein-
surance.49 Although, as in most antitrust cases, there is likely to
be substantial controversy over the nature of the alleged agree-
ment, I believe that both the existence and terms of agreement
among the indicted insurers and reinsurers are largely irrelevant
to underlying antitrust issues.50 "Thus, again for discussion, we
may presume some form of joint agreement.
The McCarran-Ferguson ActS! exempts many joint insurer
practices from the antitrust laws, but in section 3(b) excludes
"any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate."52 The more
precise legal claim in the suit, therefore, is that the defendants'
withdrawal of pollution, occurrence, and defense cost coverage
constituted an act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation, which
through section 3(b) remains subject to the Sherman Act. To
date, the parties to the litigation have expended substantial effort
in considering whether the defendants' practices are better char-
acterized as acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation that are
subject to the Sherman Act, or as some other form of insurance
practice, such as a change in terms of coverage, which the
McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts. There is no definitive law on
this issue.53 Over the years, the Supreme Court has character-
ized a wide range of disparate activities as horizontal boycotts
subject to Sherman Act prohibition.54 But very few cases have
interpreted section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act or, more
particularly, its terms "coercion" and "intimidation."
In the absence of controlling interpretation, the McCarran-
48. I will try to show that the coverage changes did not generate antitrust injury
however extensive their introduction. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
49. Complaint, supra note 47, at 1-2.
50. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
51. McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, IS U.S.C. §§ lOll-lOIS (1982).
52. [d. § 1013(b).
53. But see UNR Indus., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 607 F. Supp. 855, 862 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (claim that a concerted switch from occurrence to claims-made coverage was an
illegal boycott dismissed as a change in .. 'terms of coverage''') (quoting St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 544 (1978)).
54. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
(1986); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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Ferguson terms "boycott," "coercion," and "intimidation"
could be given internal meanings of their own.55 It seems more
sensible, however, to define these terms with reference to the
purposes and goals of the antitrust laws of which they form a
part. The antitrust laws do not prohibit all industrial agree-
ments. Many, perhaps the large majority, of industrial agree-
ments enhance consumer welfare. The antitrust laws prohibit
only industrial agreements that restrain trade.
A restraint of trade is an artificial interference with market
forces designed to increase the profits of a cartel or a monopolist.
The antitrust laws acknowledge that consumers may be affected
in many ways by normal market forces: price or output may
increase or decrease for reasons related to nothing more than
changes in supply or demand. The antitrust laws, therefore, are
not aimed at price increases or output reductions in themselves,
but at increases or reductions that result from artificial con-
straints rather than from underlying changes in supply or
demand. It is the artificial agreement to manipulate the market
in order to increase cartel or monopolist profits that constitutes
an illegal restraint of trade. Thus, to determine whether the
defendants' practices should be characterized as an "act of boy-
cott, coercion, or intimidation"56 under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, one must determine whether the practices constitute an
artificial manipulation of the market designed to increase cartel
profits.57
The practice at issue is the defendants' alleged agreement to
sell particular forms of insurance coverage. Courts that have
interpreted the Sherman Act have been very suspicious of hori-
zontal agreements involving refusals to sell or buy products, and
they have employed the prohibition of boycotts diversely to
strike down such agreements. Most typically, courts find illegal
those boycotts that are designed to maximize defendant profits
by eliminating competitors. For example, in Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States,58 a group of
55. Regrettably, this approach appears to be the one employed by Judge Schwarzer of
the Northern District of California, who has insisted first on trying summary judgment
motions on solely McCarran-Ferguson Act issues. See DiBIase, Judge Restricts Discovery
Process in States' Suits, Bus. INS., June 27, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1013(b).
57. Because by this standard the defendants' practices could be interpreted as
constituting a boycott, it is unnecessary to consider whether the terms "coercion" and
"intimidation" possess independent meaning.
58. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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lumber retailers was convicted of an antitrust violation for agree-
ing to boycott wholesalers59 who were also selling at retail. The
group's tactic restrained trade in violation of the antitrust laws
because it was designed to increase defendant profits by reducing
the group's retail competition.60 Similarly, in the classic Fashion
Originators' Guild case,61 a group of dress designers violated
antitrust laws by agreeing to boycott retail dealers who were sell-
ing the dresses of competing designers.62 Again, the boycott
restrained trade because it was designed to increase Guild profits
by reducing the' extent of design competition.63
The case that inspired the McCarran-Ferguson Act, South-
Eastern Underwriters' Association,64 was of exactly the same
nature as Fashion Originators' Guild. The Underwriters' Associ-
ation was indicted for agreeing to boycott both insurance agents
who wrote policies of non-Association members and the com-
mercial insureds who purchased such policies. Here again, the
boycott was designed to increase Association profits by reducing
the extent of insurance competition.
The Supreme Court has recently clarified the meaning of
the term "boycott" by emphasizing that, in enforcing the anti-
trust laws, courts should be particularly suspicious of refusals to
deal that are designed to increase profits by eliminating or dis-
advantaging competitors.65 According to the Court, boycotts
designed to increase profits by harming competitors constitute
per se violations of the Sherman Act.66 The Court acknowl-
edged that other forms of boycotts remain governed by the anti-·
trust laws, although subject only to review by the much less
restrictive rule of reason.67 .
The defendants' withdrawal'of pollution, occurrence, and
59: Thus, this case involved a purchasers' boycott.
60. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n, 234 U.S. at 614.
61. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S.
457 (1941). :
62. The Guild claimed that the targeted designers had illegally pirated Guild
members' designs, but 'the Court found the point Irrelevant for antitrust purposes. fd. at
468: '
. 63. fd. at 465, 467.
64. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
65. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 290-95 (1985).
66. fd. at 294.
67. fd. at 295. The rule of reason obliges a court to consider the broad range of
competitive conditions in the industry as well as all possible pro-competitive explanations
of the practice at issue. .
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defense cost coverage cannot easily be regarded as a classic boy-
cott designed to harm competitors. The refusal to offer certain
types of coverage to insurance consumers does not eliminate
insurance competition in any straightforward way.68 The boy-
cotts in the Fashion Originators' Guild and South-Eastern
Underwriters' cases were methods of punishing customers and
agents who patronized competitors. The ambition of both boy-
cotts was to force the customers to abandon the competitors in
favor of the conspiring defendants. Quite in contrast, the insur-
ance coverage withdrawals bear no obvious relationship to the
practices of competing insurers and have no clear impact on cus-
tomers of competing insurers. ,
Indeed, to,the contrary, the defendants' coverage withdraw-
als are most likely to feed competition. If pollution, occurrence,
or defense cost coverage could be offered at a profit, the defend-
ants' agreement to withdraw coverage would push insurance
consumers to competing insurers willing to offer these forms of
coverage. Here, evidence of the structure of the commercial cas-
ualty industry is most illuminating. Part I demonstrated the
very high level of actual and potential competition in the com-
mercial casualty industry in general, and in the Other Liability
line in particular. The costs are low for new firms to enter the
market, it is easy for existing insurers to expand coverage offer-
ings, and the continuous trend toward corporate self-insurance
provides a persistent incentive for insurers to design coverage
attractive to their commercial clients.69
In the face of these many sources of competition, how could
defendant insurers gain by artificially withdrawing pollution and
occurrence coverage and subsuming defense costs within the
aggregate policy limit? For commercial insureds that desire
these forms of insurance coverage, the withdrawals reduce the
attractiveness of the commercial insurance package offered by
the defendants. Following the coverage withdrawals, insureds
who anticipate future pollution claims or who face relatively
substantial defense costs will be more, not less, inclined to search
for a better insurance deal from insurers competing with the
68. I consider more specifically the Ayres-Siegelman hypothesis that the coverage
withdrawals excluded competitors by raising rivals' costs, infra Part III. The Ayres-
Siegelman hypothesis, apparently, is not shared by the Attorneys General. But see Ayres &
Siegelman, supra note 7, at n. * (professor Ayres has been retained by the plaintiffs as an
expert witness in the case.).
69. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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defendants. Given the extent of and potential for competition in
the industry, an artificial agreement to reduce the attractiveness
of the insurance product would be economic suicide.70
The coverage withdrawals, therefore, cannot plausibly be
construed as the typical horizontal boycott designed to harm
competitors.71 If there were victims to the alleged agreement to
withdraw coverage, the victims were insurance consumers. The
Supreme Court has established that the antitrust. laws reach
refusals to sell aimed solely at consumers,72 and it is upon these
cases that the Attorneys General must build the current law-
suits. As we shall see, however, each of the Supreme Court cases
has involved a plausible (although sometimes thinly plausible)
theory according to which the refusal to sell increased defendant
profits and was an artificial interference with market processes.
The case that appears to provide the greatest support for
the Attorneys' General suit is St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. v. Barry,73 in which the plaintiff accused four insurance com-
panies of conspiring to boycott consumers of medical malprac-
tice insurance in order to compel them to accept claims-made
coverage rather than occurrence coverage. The four defendants
were the only commercial malpractice insurers in the market,
and thus appeared to possess market power, though the trial
court did not consider in its market power calculation alterna-
tive forms of physician risk diversification, including self-insur-
ance by means of captive insurance sources or asset
diversification. According to the complaint, the illegal boycott
consisted of St. Paul's announcement that it would only write
claims-made malpractice coverage, pursuant to a conspiracy
with the other three insurers who refused to offer malpractice
coverage on any terms, forcing the insureds to accept claims-
made policies from St. Paul.74
St. Paul was not decided on antitrust grounds, but rather on
70. In subpart I1(B), infra, I present reasons to believe that other commercial
insureds might prefer general liability coverage that excluded pollution, occurrence, and
defense cost coverage, suggesting that the coverage withdrawals were consistent with
competitive behavior designed to enhance insurance sales.
71. As a consequence, according to Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 297,
the case must be evaluated under the rule of reason. See supra note 67 and accompanying
text. .
72. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978); Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. 284.
73. 438 U.S. 531.
74. Id. at 535.
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a motion for summary judgment regarding whether the term
"boycott" in section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
applied, as alleged, to boycotts of consumers, or applied only, as
in South-Eastern Underwriters', to boycotts designed to harm
competitors. The Supreme Court held that Congress had
intended section 3(b) to extend beyond boycotts aimed against
competitors and affirmed the reversal of the trial court's sum-
mary judgment in favor of the insurer defendants.75
The claims of the Attorneys General concerning the insur-
ance coverage withdrawals are similar to the claims in St. Paul.
The decision in St. Paul itself, of course, provides support for no
more than denial of summary judgment against the Attorneys
General. More importantly, however, in the years since St. Paul
there have been many changes in antitrust law and, in particular,
in the law relating to summary judgment of antitrust claims.
The Supreme Court decided St. Paul in 1978, just as it
began to develop its modem economic efficiency analysis of
industrial practices under the antitrust laws.76 In the interven-
ing years, the Court has much more rigorously defined the pre-
requisites of an antitrust offense. To establish a violation of the
antitrust laws, a plaintiff must show that conspiring defendants
have acted in a way to enhance their profits by harming.
competition.77
Very recently, the Supreme Court has clarified the standard
for summary judgment of an antitrust claim. In Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,78 the Court upheld
summary judgment in favor of defendants when, despite sub-
stantial factual issues concerning the nature of the conspiracy,
the acts alleged to violate the antitrust laws would not have
increased defendant profits or harmed competition. If St. Paul
were re-analyzed according to the Matsushita standard, its out-
come would not be so clear. Mere allegations of conspiracy, suf-
ficient in 1978, would not be sufficient under Matsushita to
support a trial. Most importantly, under Matsushita it is neces-
sary for complainants to establish that the defendants' actions
were economically rational ways to increase their profits by
restraining trade. As a result of Matsushita, the complainants
75. ld. at 546-52.
76. The beginning of the new approach was signalled in 1977 in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
77. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
78. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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would have to explain why three other insurers agreed to boy-
cott St. Paul's insureds, forcing them to obtain St. Paul's claims..
made coverage. An economically rational firm has no obvious
reason to help a competitor retain its clients, not to mention
retaining clients on terms that the clients find unattractive. The
incentives of competitors, in fact, are just the opposite. There-
fore, it is puzzling how the three other conspirators imagined to
profit from the alleged agreement.
Perhaps one could allege that St. Paul divided monopoly
returns from the shift to claims-made coverage with the other
three insurers. But the factual prerequisites of this theory are
even more complex. For the scheme to be an economically
rational method of maximizing profits, it would be necessary to
show that (1) the profit-maximizing output for the industry was
exactly equal to S1. Paul's insurance capacity (given the with-
drawal of the other firms); (2) insurance delivery was achieved
most efficiently by St. Paul alone (thus maximizing industry
profits), rather than by sQme combination of the four; (3) indus-
try profits were maximized by changing the nature of the prod-
uct (to claims-made coverage), rather than by the more typical
cartel strategy of simply increasing the price of the existing
product (occurrence coverage); and (4) St. Paul had shared the
industry monopoly profits (according to what shares?) with the
other three conspirators. It was exactly such a series of implau-
sible factual premises that led the Supreme Court to uphold
summary judgment in favor of the defendants in Matsushita.79
In contrast, the more plausible explanation in St. Paul is that the
other insurers had withdrawn and St. Paul had shifted to claims-
made coverage because of the increasing uncertainty of liability
exposure in the medical malpractice line. '
More recently, in Federal Trade, Commission V" Indiana
Federation ofDentists,80 the Supreme Court found that the Fed-
eration illegally boycotted COI),sumers. Even in this decision,
however, it is clear that pla~ntiffs must demonstrate that the
practice at issue increased defendants' profits by means of an
79. Id. at 588-95; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Servo Co., 391 U.S. 253, 277
(1968) (rejection of a claim of an illegal boycott of consumers on grounds that the boycott
"conceivably might also have resulted from a whole variety of non-conspiratorial motives '
involving the exercise of business judgment.").
For an explanation of how claims-made coverage is superior to oc<currence coverage
for insureds who face long-duration exposure, see infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
80. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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artificial interference with market forces, rather, than by.underly-
ing changes in supply or demand.
In Indiana Federation ofDentists, the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) accused the Federation of agreeing to a concerted
refusal to supply X-rays to dental insurers wanting to monitor
dental insurance claims.81 The dentists obviously sought to gain
supracompetitive returns from the practice because without X-
ray evidence it would be substantially more difficult for the
insurers to deny dentists' claims relating to the provision of den-
tal services. The refusal to supply X-rays thus was not a typical
product boycott, but rather a method of implementing some
agreement or understanding to charge greater than competitive
prices. It is also obvious that the refusal to submit X-rays was
an artificial interference in market processes. The dentists
alleged that X-ray submission led to inferior dental care. But
the Court disregarded the argument totally, concluding that
there was no credible pro-competitive explanation for the agree-
ment.82 Thus, again, the prerequisite of an offense-increase in
profits through artificial interference in the market-was easily
satisfied.
Does the withdrawal of pollution, occurrence, and defense
cost coverage by the insurer defendants serve to .increase profits
by an artificial interference in the market sufficient to be charac-
terized as an illegal boycott? It is difficult to see how coverage
withdrawals either increase insurer profits or constitute an artifi-
cial interference with the market. In contrast, as explained in
more detail in subsection B, there are strong reasons to believe
that the coverage withdrawals were responses to standard mar-
ket forces of increased supply costs because of the expansion of
tort liability.
Complicated empirical study would be necessary to deter-
mine whether the premiums that pollution, occurrence, and
defense cost coverage could command in the market were
greater or less than the expected future coverage costs. The
empirical calculation, however; is not necessary to the resolution
81. Ill. at 448-49. The Court characterized the victims of the conspiracy as
"customers," ill. at 459, although the seIler-customer relationship is complicated because of
the third-party claim feature of the case. Strictly, dental patients are the consumers and the
insurers are the consumers' agents. The insurers, however, were particularly vulnerable in
this case because of existing contracts with patients allowing patients the choice of dentist.
ld. at 452.
82. ld. at 459, 465.
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of the antitrust claims. At the time of withdrawal, these forms
of coverage either could be offered to commercial insureds prof-
itably or could not. Under either factual showing the withdraw-
als cannot have violated the antitrust laws.
First, if pollution, occurrence, or defense cost coverage
could have been offered profitably, then their withdrawal would
have reduced the defendants' profits and increased the profits of
the defendants' competitors.83 In this context, the coverage
withdrawals would be economic idiocy, but hardly a restraint of
trade.84 In some contexts it is possible to devise complicated
price discrimination theories to explain how changes in the
price/quality mix of product characteristics can increase prof-
its.85 But price discrimination is unlikely to have occurred in
this case because price discriminating behavior must include
charging a price. The withdrawal of pollution, occurrence, and
defense cost coverage reduces the price/quality opportunities of
any insurer or group of insurers.86
The alternative factual possibility is that pollution, occur-
rence, and defense cost coverage could not have been offered at a
profit at the time of the defendants' agreement. The lay impres-
sion that the insurance coverage withdrawals increased insurer
profits by reducing insurer losses derives from such a view.
Surely, if the insurers withdrew losing forms of insurance cover-
age, their losses would decline and their net profits would
increase.
Withdrawing losing products, however, cannot be regarded
as an illegal restraint of trade. If the withdrawal of an unprofita-
ble product were to constitute a boycott, the antitrust laws
would stand for the encrustation of industrial obsolescence that
would destroy a competitive economy. Firms withdraw prod-
ucts in response to changes in demand or supply at all times, and
83. Again, I consider the Ayres-Siegelman exclusionary hypothesis, infra Part III.
84. Ayres & Siegelman make a similar point. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 7, at
979-81.
85. See, e.g., Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in
Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34, 44-48 (1974).
86. Here, it may be relevant to consider the inclusion of defense costs in the aggregate
policy limits not as a withdrawal of coverage, but as a change in the price/quality product
mix. But there is no clear explanation why including defense costs in the aggregate policy
limits would enhance profits artificially, though there is a compelling explanation of why
the coverage change would enhance insurance availability. See infra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text.
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it is an important characteristic of a competitive economy that
they be free to do so.
The issue of product withdrawal is potentially confusing
because of the common simplification that the antitrust laws are
designed to condemn practices that artificially increase firm
profits. Price-fixing increases net profits; withdrawing losing
products also increases net profits. Are both restraints of trade?
One response, of course, is that withdrawing losing products
from markets is not artificial, but is at the heart of competitive
behavior. A more precise analysis derives, however, from defin-
ing the aim of the antitrust laws as improving the allocation of
resources in the economy. Our society wants to remove those
products from markets whose production costs (and thus prices)
are greater than what consumers are willing to pay in order to
reallocate resources to goods whose value to consumers exceeds
their costs. In contrast, the antitrust laws condemn practices
that increase profits by denying consumers products for which
they are willing and able to pay, such as by fixing prices at
greater than competitive levels. Thus, price fixing that enhances
profits by raising prices above competitive levels should be dis-
tinguished from a product withdrawal that, reduces losses
because cost has become greater than the competitive price con-
sumers will pay. Put differently, the withdrawal of products for
which consumers are unwilling to pay is quite different from the
fixing of prices of products for which consumers are willing to
pay, but would prefer to pay less.
In the present case, of course, the allegations that the insur-
ance companies made the withdrawals in concert may appear
more telling. Surely, individual firms may withdraw losing
products from markets without violating the antitrust laws.
However, should it be illegal for a group of firms or an industry
to withdraw products collectively?
Again, in the absence of an explanation how the coverage
withdrawals affirmatively generated profits unavailable in com-
petitive markets, even concerted withdrawals cannot violate the
antitrust laws because there is no antitrust injury. Of course,
insurance differs from other industries with respect to joint
industry agreements because ofvery strong state regulatory pres-
sure to standardize insurance policies. The purpose of this state
regulation is to simplify insurance forms in order to facilitate
consumer comprehension of insurance offerings. The easier it is
for consumers to compare different policies, the greater the level
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of competition in the industry and the more the competition will
focus on price rather than less fungible differences in insurance
coverage. Along with preserving insurer s'olvency, standardiza-
tion is the most basic justification for insurance industry
regula;tion. '
In many contexts the policy in favor of insurance standardi-
zation complicates the antitrust evaluation of insurance industry
agreements. It is frequently necessary to weigh uniformity inter-
ests against antitrust interests when considering insurance indus-
try practices. This is the point of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
There is no policy conflict of this nature, however, with respect
to the withdrawal of pollution, occurrence, and defense cost cov-
erage. Because these cQverage withdrawals could not have
increased insurer profits, they could not have caused antitrust
injury.
It follows, therefore, that, on antitrust grounds the Attor-
neys' General claims lack merit. The analytical case is a simple
one., Either the forms of insurance coverage withdrawn by the
defendants could be offered at a profit or they were losing prod-
ucts for which no profitable market existed. If these forms of
coverage were potentially profitable, then their withdrawal
would have reduced, rather than increased, defendants' profits.
On the other hand, if these forms of coverage could not be
offered at a profit, then their withdrawal was perfectly consistent
with behavior one would expect of competitive firms. On either
empirical showing, the coverage withdrawals generated no anti-
trust injury and cannot be held to have violated the antitrust
laws.
Demonstrating the wea~ess of the antitrust claims, how-
ever, is different from affirmatively understanding why these
forms of insurance coverage were withdrawn. Subsection B
presents a different explanation for the coverage withdrawals by
returning to the evidence of the shift in the structure of the com-
mercial casualty industry toward self-insurance. It shows that
the coverage withdrawals represent merely an extension of the
shift toward corporate self-insurance of particular risks. Subsec-
tion B also shows that the most plausible explanation for the
insurers' actions is that the coverage withdrawals at issue were
designed to enhance insurance availability to low-risk insureds
by segregating the low-risk members into pools incorporating
smaller differences in risks.
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B. The Competitive Purpose of the Coverage Withdrawals
This Section explains how the defendants' withdrawals of
pollution, occurrence, and defense cost coverage were responses
to competitive market forces in the commercial casualty insur-
ance industry. As noted in Part I, since the early 1970s firms
with Other Liability exposure have increasingly shifted from
market insurance to forms of self-insurance. This shift most
probably is the result of the expansion of corporate tort liability.
Expanded tort liability increases the variance of some corporate
risks (because of the third-party insurance delivery mechanism)
and increases the dependence of other risks. Part I showed how
the increase in risk variance and risk dependence, in the aggre-
gate, stimulated the growth of captive insurance subsidiaries; the
expansion of self-insurance expenditures through deductibles,
coinsurance, and exclusions; and the increase in corporate use of
the mutual insurance form. 87 This Section shows how the with-
drawals of pollution, occurrence, and defense cost coverage were
only specific instances of this aggregate industry trend.
How will insurers in competitive markets respond to the
increase in risk dependence and risk variance to maximize insur-
ance sales? When corporate risks become more dependent
(more highly correlated), there are very few competitive
responses available to market insurers. Greater dependence of
risks diminishes the comparative advantage of market insurance.
At the limit, if some event is certain to occur, the reserve needed
by a market insurer equals the reserve needed by a corporate
self-insurer. When there are no gains available from pooling,
market insurers can only decline or exclude coverage.
\
Insurers, however, have greater opportunities for competi-
tive response to increases in risk variance. For every insurance
pool, the pool premium must be set equal to the average risk of
the pool. Thus, the pool premium will always be greater than
the risk brought by low-risk members. When risk variance
increases, the difference increases between the premium and the
risk level of low-risk members.
Within any insurance pool, low-risk insureds will always be
the marginal insurance purchasers. Sales competition within the
insurance industry consists largely of efforts to attract the rela-
tively low-risk insureds of a competitor by more careful under-
writing, either by reassigning the insured to a pool incorporating
87. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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lower risks (at a lower premium) or by redefining coverage to
meet more precisely the low-risk insured's needs.88 Both tactics
make possible lower premiums for low-risk insureds.
Because an increase in risk variance compels an increase in
insurance premiums, the expansion of liability increases the dis-
satisfaction of relatively low-risk insureds with the insurance
deal that they are receiving. The expansion ofliability, thus, will
encourage low-risk insureds to seek a better insurance deal from
competing insurers or, at the limit, to drop out of the pool to
self-insure rather than to continue paying premiums greater than
the risk they bring to the pool.
The expansion of liability thus will increase competition in
the commercial casualty industry. Competition will consist of
efforts to reassign low-risk insureds to lower-risk pools or to
redefine coverage to make it more attractive to such insureds.
Put differently, insurers under competition will attempt methods
of more accurate segregation of low-risk from high-risk mem-
bers. More accurate risk segregation, if feasible, restores (or
helps to restore) the previous relationship between the premium
and the risk brought to the pool by low-risk members. More
extensive risk segregation, therefore, enhances insurance availa-
bility to low-risk insureds.
Given these legal and market conditions, how can we evalu-
ate the withdrawal of pollution, occurrence, and defense cost
insurance coverage?
1. The Withdrawal of Pollution Coverage
It is well-known that liability for pollution-related losses
has expanded in recent years. This expansion of liability is a
result of the judicial recognition of new rights of action as well
as the relaxation of causation standards and the erosion of ear-
lier interpretations of statutes of limitation.89 Allowing new
remedies in tort law for pollution-related losses will increase risk
variance by substituting third- for first-party insurance delivery.
New remedies may also increase corporate risk dependence,
especially for firms, municipalities, or industries heavily involved
in the production or disposal of toxic wastes.
The expansion of pollution liability will not affect all firms
88. Of course, insurers may also compete by lowering expenses or achieving greater
investment returns, both of which would similarly make possible lower premiums.
89. See generally Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits ofInsurance, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 942 (1988).
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or municipalities equally. Firms or municipalities that have had
little association with hazardous wastes will be largely indiffer-
ent to the expansion. In contrast, firms that in the past have
generated or have disposed of wastes, or municipalities that have
supervised disposal, may be heavily affected by the expansion of
liability.
Commercial General Liability coverage is standardized; it is
offered on largely identical policy terms to all firms and all
municipalities. To the extent that the policy provides coverage
of pollution-related losses, an increase in pollution liability will
compel an increase in the policy premium. This premium
increase will benefit firms and municipalities that face relatively
greater pollution-related claims; it is of relativ~ly less benefit to
firms and municipalities with little or no pollution exposure. In
this respect, firms and municipalities that face pollution-related
claims bring high risks to the pool; firms and municipalities that
do not face such claims bring low risks.
Again, the expansion of liability and the consequent
increase in risk variance will increase competitive pressures to
provide alternative insurance that is more attractive to low-risk
insureds. In the context of the expansion of pollution liability,
Commercial General Liability coverage could be made more
attractive to the low-risk insured in two ways. First, insurers
could increase investments in underwriting to evaluate firms and
municipalities more discriminately according to their potential
pollution exposure, and set premiums accordingly. This tactic
will be successful to the extent that such predictions can be made
accurately at costs less than the increased return from such
discrimination.
Second, insurers can attempt to segregate into separate risk
pools firms and municipalities that face pollution exposure from
those that do not. The exclusion of pollution coverage from the
basic policy serves this segregation purpose and reduces differ-
ences in risk (reduces risk variance) between members of the
pool because it makes all insureds within the pool equivalent
with respect to potential pollution claims. The pollution exclu-
sion prevents the prospective costs of pollution from being aver-
aged into the premiums of nonpolluters.
In this way, the pollution exclusion makes the basic policy
less attractive to firms or municipalities that anticipate future
pollution-related claims. However, it makes the policy more
attractive to low-risk insureds who are not likely to face such
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exposures. Again, in all insurance markets, low-risk insureds
are the marginal insurance purchasers over whom the major
competition in insurance occurs. As a competitive device, the
exclusion allows Commercial General Liability coverage to be
offered at a lower premium that is more attractive to nonpollut-
ing, low-risk insureds. The exclusion will expand insurance
availability (that is to say, sales) to this group.
The exclusion of pollution coverage from the Commercial
General Liability policy does not necessarily imply that insur-
ance for pollution-related losses will be totally unavailable.
Instead, the exclusion compels firms and municipalities poten-
tially responsible for pollution-related injuries to buy pollution
coverage separately or to self-insure for such claims. Pollution
coverage will be totally unavailable chiefly when the expansion
of liability has so increased risk dependence that market insurers
have no comparative advantage to the insureds themselves in
providing coverage of pollution losses.
2. The Withdrawal of Occurrence Coverage Through
Adoption of the Claims-Made Policy
All insurance is sold for a specific time period subject to
renewal at the end of the period. An occurrence policy provides
coverage for losses from accidents that occur during the policy
period, regardless of when claims relating to the losses are filed.
A claims-made policy, in contrast, provides coverage for all
claims filed during the policy period, regardless of when under-
lying accidents occur.
For most types of accidental liability, no effective difference
exists between an occurrence and a clainis-made policy because
. claims under the policy will be filed within a short period of the
occurrence of the accident. For example, there would be little
difference if an auto liability policy were written on a claims-
made or an occurrence basis because typically there is little delay
between the occurrence of an accident and the filing of a claim.
The claims-made policy will differ from the occurrence pol-
icy, however, in contexts in which there is substantial time
between the occurrence of the accident and the filing of the
claim. These contexts are referred to as involving "long tail"
liability. Examples of such contexts are diseases that have long
latency periods like those caused by asbestos inhalation or expo-
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sure to other toxic substances.9o
In all insurance contexts, when an insurer gains informa-
tion leading to a more accurate prediction of future claims costs,
the insurer will adjust the premium charged for the next period,
either up or down, depending upon the new estimate.91 Claims-
made and occurrence policies differ chiefly in the opportunity
available to the insurer to acquire and to act upon this informa-
tion. For losses characterized by long-tail liability, an insurer is
far more readily able to revise its prediction of the underlying
risk level if coverage is offered on a claims-made rather than on
an occurrence basis. For example, under a claims-made policy,
when claims involving long latency periods begin to accumulate,
the insurer can revise its expectations of future liability and
increase the premium or, in extreme cases, decide not to renew
coverage, thus requiring the affected firm to self-insure. In con-
trast, if such coverage had been written on an occurrence basis
years before (that is, at the time the latent injuries first
"occurred"),92 the insurer would be bound to the premiums set
at that earlier time. The insurer would have no ability to revise
premiums based upon its new appreciation of the risk level.
The claims-made policy, thus, allows the insurer a much
greater opportunity to revise its premium according to the losses
incurred by the insured. It also resembles policies that incorpo-
rate retrospective rating or adopt the mutual form, in both of
which the final premium is set largely after the loss experience
occurs.
In comparison to the occurrence policy, the claims-made
policy can be viewed as shifting much of the risk of long-tail
liability from the insurer back to the insured. In this respect, the
claims-made policy represents another form of increased corpo-
rate self-insurance for losses. Under claims-made coverage, an
insured that generates long-tail liability will pay, through revised
premiums, a much greater portion of total liability costs. Note
90. The period of time between occurrence and claim, of course, depends on the legal
definition of occurrence. See infra note 92.
91. Thus, auto insurers increase or reduce premiums based upon previous accident or
moving violation experience. These adjustments allow premiums to be kept low for low-
risk insureds, such as safe drivers.
92. For latent diseases, there is substantial delay between the occurrence of an injury
and the claim only when "occurrence" is defined as the first exposure to or harm from the
injurious substance. If courts defined the occurrence of the injury as its first manifestation,
there would be no substantial delay between the occurrence and the claim and no need for a
claims-made policy.
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again, however, that the claims-made policy shifts risks back to
the insured only for long-tail liability exposure. To the extent
that the policy covers more typical accidents, for which there is
little delay between the occurrence and the claim, no effective
difference exists between claims-made and occurrence coverage.
Why would insurers introduce the claims-made policy? As
liability for latent diseases expands, low-risk firms not facing
such liability will find insurance premiums increasingly greater
than the risk they bring to the pool. The claims-made policy,
like the pollution exclusion, provides a way of splitting off those
who generate long-tail liability from the rest of the business com-
munity. The claims-made policy ensures that the expected
future costs of long-tail liability are not averaged into the premi-
ums of commercial insureds that do not generate such liability.
The adoption of claims-made coverage, thus, is a means of com-
peting for low-risk insureds by offering coverage more appropri-
ate for their insurance needs.
Indeed, the claims-made policy provides a particularly
clever method for segregating low- from high-risk insureds.
Again, in contexts in which claims are filed within a short period
of the accident, there will be little difference between claims-
made and occurrence coverage. Thus, with the claims-made
policy, the insured is not forced to expend the costs necessary for
the careful estimation of the particular long-tail liability expo-
sure of each insured. Instead, the subsequent claims experience
of each insured will reveal how much of its liability is long- ver-
sus short-tail. Many parties have objected to claims-made cover-
age because it appears to grant substantially greater discretion to
insurers to subsequently revise premiums.93 In fact, claims-
made coverage should be attractive to low-risk insureds because
they will receive coverage equivalent to that under an occur-
rence policy, but at a cost less than the premium necessary to
cover the long-tail liability expenses of high-risk insureds.94
3. The Inclusion of Defense Costs in the Aggregate·
Coverage Limit
During the crisis of 1985-1986, widespread reductions
93. See Insurance Comm'n Report, supra note 4, at 152. These objections are largely
fanciful, not only because of the high levels of competition in the commercial casualty
industry, but also because insurers typically possess unilateral discretion to raise premiums
under occurrence policies annualIy.
94. For a further discussion of this point, see infra note 112.
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occurred in the aggregate coverage limits offered under commer-
cial policies,95 but the defendants are accused of agreeing to a
more particular form of aggregate limit reduction-reduction by
the inclusion of defense costs. Including defense costs in the
aggregate limit means that for a policy offering one million dol-
lars in aggregate coverage, the costs to the insurer of defending
or settling claims against the policy will be charged (along with
actual liability payouts) against the one million dollar limit,
rather than being absorbed by the insurer separately, as under
previous policies.
Why would insurers change policy terms to include defense
costs within the policy aggregate? More precisely, if insurers
desire to reduce aggregate policy limits, why would they reduce
them by including defense costs in the limit rather than by (or in
addition to) reducing them directly, for example by offering only
$800,000 rather than $1,000,000 aggregate coverage?
The general expansion of corporate liability is likely to
affect firms disparately. Business entities will certainly differ in
terms of the increase in the frequency of claims. They may also
differ in terms of the increase in the complexity of underlying
claims. In addition, though firms may face equivalent increases
in claims frequency or complexity, they may differ in their abili-
ties through internal counsel to manage the claims filed against
them.
The costs to the insurer of settling or defending claims must
be added into the policy premium. Those firms generating rela-
tively more frequent or complex claims will contribute more to
these costs than firms generating fewer and simpler claims. Sim-
ilarly, firms less able to manage their claims load will contribute
more to these costs than firms more skilled at claims
management.
When there are substantial differences among insured firms
in terms of expected insurer defense expenses, those firms gener-
ating lower expenses become the relatively low-risk members of
commercial risk pools. For such firms, paying premiums that
reflect average defense expenses charges them more than the
expenses they generate. These firms become the marginal insur-
ance consumers over which market insurers will compete.
As with the pollution and occurrence coverage exclusions,
95. See, e.g., Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1573-74 (coverage for city of
Hartford, Connecticut reduced from $31 to $4 million); see also Sorry, Your Policy Is
Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 17 (citing more examples).
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incorporating defense costs in the aggregate policy limit is a way
of offering insurance at lower premiums to these relatively low-
risk firms. The defense cost inclusion has the effect of imposing
greater total expenditures on firms generating relatively higher
defense costs because such firms will more rapidly exhaust the
aggregate and be forced to self-insure the remaining liability
exposure. In this respect, like claims-made coverage, the defense
cost inclusion is another example of the long-term shift toward
greater corporate self-insurance. More directly, however, the
defense cost inclusion is a device that insurers would adopt to
compete better for the custom of low-risk insureds.
In addition to lowering premiums for low-risk insureds, the
inclusion of defense costs in the coverage limit may also serve to
reduce societal expenditures on defense costs. When defense
costs are paid totally by the insurer, the insured firm has little
concern about defense cost magnitude. Indeed, except for effects
on future premiums (effects necessarily diffused because of the
pooling process), the insured firm would prefer the insurer to
expend infinite amounts on defense to help reduce the insured's
liability exposure. In contrast, when defense costs are included
in the coverage limit, insured firms have a substantial interest in
reducing or controlling the extent of necessary defense expendi-
tures in order to maximize basic insurance coverage. These dif-
ferential incentives are referred to as moral hazard, a pervasive
insurance phenomenon most typically addressed by deductibles
and coinsurance.96 Including defense costs in the coverage limit,
therefore, is also an example of a method to control insured
moral hazard, adopted after the increase in defense expenditures
impedes insurance sales to low-risk insureds.
4. The Coverage Exclusions Reconsidered
The defendants' withdrawals of pollution, occurrence, and
defense cost coverage are closely similar in several ways. First,
for each area of coverage, expenditures are highly likely to have
increased in recent years as a consequence of the expansion of
tort liability, such as pollution and long-tail liability for the con-
sequences of toxic substances. Of course, the general expansion
of corporate liability will increase aggregate defense
expenditures.
96. See R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER & C. WILLIAMS, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACfICES: PROPERTY AND LIABILITY 15-21 (6th ed. 1976).
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Second, for each of these areas, the expansion of liability is
likely to affect insured firms differently. Some firms will face
heavy increases in liability exposure, yet others will face little
increase. Differential effects of this nature will increase risk vari-
ance within commercial casualty risk pools, increasing incen-
tives for low-risk members to seek alternative coverage from a
competing market insurer or through self-insurance.
Third, the exclusions of pollution, occurrence, and defense
cost coverage each operate in the same way: each exclusion
serves to define the extent of insurance coverage to reflect more
accurately the insurance needs of low-risk members, essentially,
by removing from the risk pool not high-risk members in their
entirety, but the sources of the high risks these members gener-
ate. The exclusion of pollution coverage culls out pollution
claims; the exclusion of occurrence coverage through adoption
of the claims-made policy culls out claims deriving from long-
tail liability; the inclusion of defense costs in the aggregate culls
out (after exhaustion of the limit) greater than average defense
expenditures. In each case, removing the sources of high risk
serves to equalize members of the risk pool in terms of the costs
they add to the pool and thus to reduce insurance premiums for
relatively low-risk members.
Each of these reasons suggests that the coverage exclusions
represent competitive responses to changes in the underlying
market for commercial liability insurance. The expansion of
corporate liability increases the costs of providing liability insur-
ance. Each coverage withdrawal represents an effort to soften
the effects of the underlying cost increase in order to maximize
insurance sales. The alternative response available to insurers
when underlying liability costs increase is not to exclude cover-
age, but simply to average in the greater pollution, occurrence,
and defense cost expenses in the premiums of all insureds. To
have pursued this alternative, however, would clearly have
increased premiums and necessarily have reduced insurance
sales by a greater amount. Put differently, relative to the passing
along of average cost increases through raising premiums, these
exclusions of coverage serve to increase insurance output. It is
well-established in economic analysis that the best test of the
pro-competitive or anti-competitive character of a practice is
whether it increases or contracts industry output. Because the
coverage withdrawals increased insurance output (again, com-
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pared to the alternative of general premium increases), they
enhanced competition in commercial casualty insurance.
In addition, each coverage withdrawal at issue resembles,
and is consistent with, the more general trend toward greater
corporate self-insurance in commercial casualty since the early
1970s, as illustrated in Figure 2 above. Indeed, more prominent
during 1985-1986 than the coverage withdrawals were the
broader increases in deductibles and coinsurance for many com-
mercial insureds.97 Moreover, during this period many other
forms of coverage were excluded from commercial policies, such
as coverage of claims relating to mergers and acquisitions from
Directors' and Officers' policies,98 coverage of claims involving
sex abuse from day-care policies,99 and coverage of claims
against high-risk nurse midwives from medical malpractice poli-
cies. 1°O Each of these insurance changes reflects the broader
trend toward corporate self-insurance. The withdrawals of pol-
lution, occurrence, and defense cost coverage are only more spe-
cific examples.
There is substantial evidence, in addition, that the underly-
ing change in liability costs that generated the coverage with-
drawals inflicted similar effects beyond the commercial casualty
insurance industry. At the same time the defendants were with-
drawing insurance coverage because of expanded liability, self-
insured entities, in the face of increases in liability costs,101
decided to withdraw products and services from markets for lia-
bility reasons. The self-insured City of New York, for example,
removed diving boards from city schools. 102 Many self-insured
ski areas closed down for liability reasons. 103 More generally, of
the nation's largest manufacturers, the Fortune 500, whose size
and obvious capacity for self-insurance make them least vulnera-
97. For examples of increases in deductibles, see Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note
I, at 1571 (deductible for city of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, increased from $100,000 in 1984
to $500,000 in 1985) (citing Bus. INS., July 8, 1985, at 1). For examples of coinsurance
increases, see Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra, at 1573.
98. Wyatt Corp., 1985 Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Survey 21-24
(1985). For a broader discussion of the many other forms of exclusions in Directors' and
Officers' policies, see Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 67 (W. Olson ed. 1988).
99. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1572; see Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled,
supra note 95, at 20.
100. Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1579; see N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1986, at
B7, col. 2.
101. Insuring Our Future, supra note 44, at 35-39.
102. Id. at 87.
103. Id. at 23-24.
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ble to insurance industry crises, twenty-five percent removed
high-risk products from markets for liability reasons.104
The accumulated force of these similar phenomena deeply
undercuts the Attorneys' General allegations that the coverage
withdrawals were the result of nothing more than insurer con-
spiracy. The steady and continuous trend toward self-insurance
as illustrated in Figure 2 does not appear to be the result of con-
spiracy; the coverage withdrawals are closely similar. Moreover,
the uniformity of the increase in liability costs to both insurers
and the self-insured, and the withdrawal of high-risk products
and services by the self-insured, make highly implausible the
claim that these phenomena derived solely from an insurer and
reinsurance agreement. It is most unlikely that self-insured enti-
ties, including cities and municipalities, would be partners to an
insurance industry conspiracy.
Ayres and Siegelman criticize my earlier (and less detailed)
explanation of the coverage withdrawals, which was made along
the same lines, on the grounds that many insureds resisted the
coverage withdrawals. According to Ayres and Siegelman, if the
coverage withdrawals reduced insurance premiums and
expanded insurance availability, the withdrawals should have
been a source of welcome, not complaint, to both low-risk firms
(whose premiums would decline) and high-risk firms (who
otherwise might be denied coverage altogether).lOs
There is a point here, but not a telling point. It must be
remembered that, according to my explanation, the coverage
withdrawals represented a competitive attempt to soften the
effects of the underlying increase in liability costs. It is not clear
(and I have not claimed) that the coverage withdrawals could
have totally offset the underlying increase in costs. If not, then
the insurance package offered to all commercial insureds, even
including the coverage withdrawals, would have represented an
increase in total insurance costs over costs in preceding periods.
All humans complain about increases in costs.
Ayres and Siegelman would have a point and my pro-com-
petitive explanation of the coverage withdrawals would be
undercut, however, if it could be shown that the insurance pack-
age (defined to include both the extent of coverage and the pre-
mium), were less advantageous to low-risk insureds after the
104. N. Weber, Product Liability, CONF. Bo., Rep. No. 893,4-7 (1987).
lOS. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 7, 988-89.
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coverage withdrawals than before. That is, the appropriate com-
parison is not between a 1984 insurance package that provides
pollution, occurrence, and defense cost coverage and a 1985
package that does not. All consumers may very well complain
about this difference. To understand the effects of the coverage
withdrawals, instead, one must compare the attractiveness to a
low-risk insured of a 1985 policy including full pollution, occur-
rence, and defense cost coverage, given the premium necessary
to support such coverage, with a 1985 policy that, by excluding
these forms of coverage, can be offered at a lower premium.
This count~r-factual comparison has never been attempted
and can only be answered analytically. Again, because the pre-
mium of the full coverage policy must be set by averaging into
the premium the greater liability costs of high-risk insureds, it is
most improbable that relatively low-risk insureds would prefer
the policy with full coverage. More generally, when there is sub-
stantial variance in liability costs across insured firms, those
firms generating low costs are better off with exclusions of high-
risk coverages than they are paying the larger premium full cov-
erage would necessitate.
Finally, it must be emphasized again that there is no coher-
ent anticompetitive explanation for the coverage withdrawals.
This section has shown that the principal effect of the withdraw-
als is to segregate low-risk from high-risk members of commer-
cial casualty pools by culling out high-risk exposures. There is
no reason to believe that segregation of this nature would be of
some special advantage to a cartel or monopolist. In theory, car-
tels and monopolies can gain from price discrimination by
charging different prices to consumer groups reflecting greater
or lesser price elasticity of demand. Toward this end, consumers
reflecting low price elasticity (consumers with relatively more
product alternatives) are charged lower prices; consumers
reflecting high price elasticity (those with fewer alternatives) are
charged higher prices.
Excluding insurance coverage to provide lower premiums
to low-risk members facing greater self-insurance alternatives is
consistent with this aim. But it is not consistent, indeed it is
contradictory, to exclude coverage to the high-risk rather than
to reprice these forms of coverage at greater than competitive
levels. The ambition of price discrimination is to charge a
greater than competitive price to consumers reflecting high price
elasticities, such as high-risk insureds. The exclusion of pollu-
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tion, occurrence, and defense cost coverage cannot be a means of
illegally maximizing profits because no revenues can be gener-
ated where the insurance product is kept from the market.
Again, excluding coverage is not a rational means ofmaximizmg
profits.
III. THE AYRES-SIEGELMAN EXCLUSIONARY THEORY OF
THE COVERAGE WITHDRAWALS
This Part briefly discusses the hypothesis put forward by
Ayres and Siegelman that the defendants' coverage withdrawals
restrained trade by raising competitors' costs to enhance the
defendants' competitive position. They concede that their the-
ory is speculative and that a definitive estimate of the effect of
the defendants' practices on competitors' costs must await fur-
ther study.lo6 Nevertheless, it is worth reviewing the data
presented in Part I concerning the structure of the commercial
casualty industry because such data allow a clearer view of the
plausibility that the coverage withdrawals raised rivals' costs.
It is accepted in principle, although there have been few
confirming empirical examples, that a cartel or monopolist can
gain if it can arrange a method to raise the production costs of
competitors at no, or at a lesser, increase in cost to itself. The
higher costs faced by competitors establish a margin within
which the cartel or monopolist can charge a supracompetitive
price.
According to Ayres and Siegelman, the defendants' cover-
age withdrawals might raise rivals' costs in two ways. First, the
shift to the claims-made policy might increase some set of fixed
actuarial costs, which would more seriously harm small insurers
than the relatively large defendants. 107 Second, the definition of
retroactive coverage dates (dates from which coverage begins) in
claims-made policies might reduce competition by binding
insureds to original insurers to benefit the larger defendants over
their smaller competitors. lOS Note that Ayres' and Siegelman's
exclusionary hypotheses applies only to the adoption of claims-
made coverage; Ayres and Siegelman do not claim that the
exclusions of pollution or defense cost coverage affected rivals'
costs in any way.109
106. Id. at 991.
107. Id. at 989-90.
108. Id. at 990-91.
109. Again, Ayres and Siegelman appear skeptical of the Attorneys' General claims
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How plausible is it that the claims-made policy was adopted
as a means to raise rivals' costs rather than to segregate out
insureds with long-tail liability exposure? Part I showed that, by
all measures, the costs of entry in the commercial casualty
industry are very low. Concentration levels are low. Individual
insurer market shares are low. Substantial changes occur from
year to year in individual insurer rankings in terms of the vol-
ume of premiums written. 110
These empirical characteristics of the industry-low con-
centration levels, low individual market shares, and frequent
shifts in individual insurer premium volume-all undercut the
assertion that there are heavy fixed costs in insurance underwrit-
ing. Industries in which there are heavy fixed production costs,
in contrast, are characterized by high concentration, high indi-
vidual firm market shares, and infrequent changes in sales
volume. 11 1
According to Ayres and Siegelman, adoption of the claims-
made policy might increase the fixed costs of insurance that
derive from the use of computer programs and the need for
large-scale actuarial estimation. There is no evidence, however,
that fixed actuarial costs have a substantial influence on industry
structure. If fixed costs were an important determinant of insur-
ance premium levels, market shares would be substantially
higher than they are. It is extremely difficult to imagine that the
computer programming investments necessary for administra-
tion of claims-made policies would be so substantial in the abso-
lute that they would empower supracompetitive pricing.
Certainly the claims-made policy will require new and perhaps
different actuarial calculations, but it is the function of organiza-
tions such as the Insurance Services Office to provide informa-
tion of this nature. As a consequence, it is highly implausible
that the principal purpose of the claims-made policy was to dis-
advantage competitors rather than to segregate long-tail liability
exposures. 112
regarding these coverage withdrawals. See id. at 979-82 (theory to explain how conspiracy
would have increased defendants profits not immediately apparent); id. at 987-93
(exclusionary theory only used to explain adoption of claims-made coverage).
110. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
111. A limiting case is a natural monopoly industry.
112. Ayres' and Siegelman's chief support for the hypothesis is the resistance to the
introduction of claims-made coverage by smaller insurers and by some set of insureds.
Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 988-91. For a discussion of insured resistance, see
supra note 105 and accompanying text. Of course, the claims-made is only superior to the
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Ayres' and Siegelman's second hypothesis is that the
claims-made policy was introduced in order to employ the retro-
active date feature to bind insureds to the originating insurer. A
retroactive date (sometimes called a retro-date) represents a
form of melding of occurrence and claims-made coverage.113
Those claims-made policies actually introduced in the market
were never pure claims-made policies, as I had described them
earlier,114 but policies for which the claims-made period was pre-
ceded by a period of occurrence coverage commencing at what is
called the retroactive date. According to Ayres and Siegelman,
the provision of a retroactive period of occurrence coverage is
conditioned on the continued purchase of claims-made coverage
from the same insurer. Thus, insureds who consider switching
to competing insurers face the prospect of losing this level of
occurrence coverage if they switch. Ayres and Siegelman sug-
gest that large insurers might benefit more from the binding
effect of the retroactive date because insureds, knowing that they
will be bound, are likely to differentially prefer larger insurers
(such as the defendants) because they appear more solvent.11s
How plausible is it that the defendants pressed for adoption
of the claims-made policy to achieve the binding effect of the
retroactive date because it would create relatively greater con-
sumer preference for large and solvent insurers? The thread of
supposition seems quite thin. Indeed, the Ayres-Siegelman
hypothesis contains an internal inconsistency.
Consumer preference to be insured by relatively large and
solvent insurers is likely to be greater under occurrence than
under claims-made coverage. Given legal definitions of accident
occurrence,116 the coverage purchased under an occurrence pol-
icy may be in force for a very long period of time. In contrast,
coverage under a pure claims-made policy terminates at the end
of the policy period. 117 Insured concerns about the continued
longevity and ultimate solvency of the insurer, thus, are certain
to be much greater under occurrence than under claims-made
occurrence policy for insurers whose clients comprise firms with substantial exposure to
long-tail liability. For insurers without such clients, adoption of the claims-made adds little
and imposes adjustment costs which, however small, may generate resistance.
113. Id., at 986-87, 996-97.
114. See supra subpart II(B)(2).
115. Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 990.
116. See supra note 92.
117. Because of competitive pressures, insurers have extended the running period of
claims-made policies in many ways. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1526.
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policies., Indeed, this point is the basis for Ayres' and Siegel-
man's belief that the occurrence feature of the retroactive date
provision would serve to advantage large and solvent insurers
such as the defendants.
According to this view, however, large insurers like the
defendants are likely to benefit more from the maintenance of
occurrence coverage than from adoption of claims-made cover-
age. On these grounds, the defendants should have resisted
introduction of the claims-made policy, rather than have con-
spired to achieve it. If there were no other effects on premiums,
claims-made coverage would benefit small and relatively poorly
financed insurers whose likelihood of survival is much greater
for the short period of claims-made coverage than for the long
and extended periods of occurrence coverage. By this view, the
defendant insurers appear victims of the adoption of the claims-
made policy. Ayres' and Siegelman's analysis of the effect of the
retroactive date would seem to exonerate the defendants from
exclusionary motives.
It is more plausible to view the retroactive date provisions
of claims-made policies as themselves representing additional
evidence of the high -level of competition in the commercial casu-
alty industry. Efforts to introduce pure claims-made coverage
into commercial casualty appear to have failed. The retroactive
date provision restores some period of occurrence coverage. The
failure of pure claims-made coverage suggests that the extent of
differences in risk deriving from long-tail liability are not suffi-
cient to offset the desire of commercial insureds for some long-
tail coverage. Every insured faces some prospect of long-taillia-
bility. Long-tail liabilities that are probabilistic in nature can be
successfully insured. It is only where long-tail liabilities are
highly correlated among insureds that insurers must respond by
culling them out from normal commercial risk pools. It is possi-
ble, of course, that the introduction of more specific coverage
exclusions, such as the exclusion of pollution coverage, were suf-
ficient to isolate those long-tail liabilities that are highly corre-
lated. More precise explanations require further study, but it is
clear that the conception of claims-made coverage has suffered
many amendments in the face of commercial casualty
competition.
As a consequence, neithet of the hypotheses of Professor
Ayres and Mr. Siegelman provides a plausible explanation of
how the withdrawal of occurrence coverage excluded competi-
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tors to restrain trade. In contrast, as described in Part II, there
are strong reasons to believe that the coverage withdrawals were
efforts to define coverage to maintain the custom of low-risk
insureds.
IV. THE LAWSUITS IN THE CONTEXT OF BROADER SOCIAL
POLICIES TOWARD INSURANCE
It is a basic ambition of a moral society to provide the
greatest level of insurance against losses suffered by its citizens.
Equally it is the basic ambition of a competitive economy, as
with any other product, to expand insurance availability to sat-
isfy consumer insurance demands more fully. In general,
enforcement of the antitrust laws serves to expand production.
It is the specific ambition of the antitrust suits against the insur-
ers to deter what the Attorneys General believe are anticompeti-
tive practices restraining trade in insurance.
The careful examination of the Attorneys' General case in
Part III, however, shows that the insurance antitrust suits will
not generate that result. Where there is an increase in risk vari-
ance, insurance availability is expanded by facilitating the segre-
gation of risks into narrow risk pools. Often this segregation is
achieved by more extensive insurance discrimination, as here, by
excluding some forms of coverage from risk pools altogether.
There is an additional public policy ground for encouraging
the segregation of polluters and other high risk insureds into sep-
arate risk pools. A central ambition of tort liability is to create
financial incentives to improve the level of safety in our society.
It is a fundamental premise of modern law to charge manufac-
turers and other tortfeasors differentially according to the levels
of injury that their products and activities cause. Our society
invests very little in the direct regulation of product safety.
Instead, we rely in largest part on the marketplace to police
safety levels. Accordingly, we expect that if one product is rela-
tively more dangerous than another, the higher liability costs
that tort law imposes will either compel the manufacturer to
invest to make the product safer or will compel the product to be
sold at a higher price, with resulting lower demand. This is the
basic underlying premise of strict products liabilityYs
It has long been recognized that insurance for liability costs
118. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 702 (1962) (in bank).
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blunts safety incentives. The purpose of insurance is to lower
the expected costs of risky activities. Expected liability costs
with insurance will be lower than expected liability costs without
insurance. Again, since the premium for an insurance pool must
be set with respect to the average risk of the pool, the more that
low-risk insureds are merged with high-risk insureds, the lower
the effective premium to those generating high costs.
It follows that more extensive segregation according to risk
level increases the correspondence of insurance costs to the costs
the insured has imposed on society by its activities. Put more
simply, segregation in insurance makes tortfeasors pay more of
the injury costs that they generate. The pollution exclusion, the
claims-made policy, and the inclusion of defense costs help to
better achieve the ends of tort law by making tortfeasors pay
their own way,119
The attack by the Attorneys General on the coverage exclu-
sions, therefore, is particularly counterproductive. The Attor-
neys' General lawsuits will deter insurance segregation and
reduce insurance availability. As suggested earlier, the Attor-
neys' General attack reflects deep confusion about the role of
insurance in society and the means of increasing insurance avail-
ability. Because much of modem policy toward insurance has
derived from viewing insurance solely as a distributive risk-
spreading mechanism, rather than as a mechanism for reducing
risks, little attention has been given to specific public policies
that constrict insurance availability.
Perhaps ironically, the insurance antitrust suits provide an
excellent occasion for reversing this policy focus. The antitrust
laws, unlike much of state regulation, are strongly committed to
expanding output. It is only through the persistent focus on
means of expanding insurance availability that the strong moral
and economic goals of providing greater insurance against loss
can be achieved.
119. It is on this basis that the State of New York in the early 1970s required insurers
to exclude pollution coverage, 1971 N.Y. Laws 2633 (repealed 1982), just as many states
today compel insurers to exclude coverage of punitive damages. See, e.g., !CAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2, 115 (1986).
